2018-044: Mike Samuels discusses NodeJS hardening initiatives

Mike Samuels

https://twitter.com/mvsamuel

https://github.com/mikesamuel/attack-review-testbed

https://nodejs-security-wg.slack.com/

Hardening NodeJS

 

Speaking engagement talks:

A Node.js Security Roadmap at JSConf.eu - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1Gun2lRb5Gw

Improving Security by Improving the Framework @ Node Summit - https://vimeo.com/287516009

Achieving Secure Software through Redesign at Nordic.js - https://www.facebook.com/nordicjs/videos/232944327398936/?t=1781

What is a package: (holy hell, why is this so complicated?)

   

A package is any of:

1. a) a folder containing a program described by a package.json file
2. b) a gzipped tarball containing (a)
3. c) a url that resolves to (b)
4. d) a <name>@<version> that is published on the registry with ©
5. e) a <name>@<tag> that points to (d)
6. f) a <name> that has a latest tag satisfying (e)
7. g) a git url that, when cloned, results in (a).

https://medium.com/@jsoverson/exploiting-developer-infrastructure-is-insanely-easy-9849937e81d4

 

https://blog.risingstack.com/node-js-security-checklist/

 

https://www.npmjs.com/package/trusted-types

https://github.com/WICG/trusted-types/issues/31

Here is a new episode of Brakeing Down Security Podcast!

2018-043-Adam-Baldwin, npmjs Director of Security, event stream post mortem, and making your package system more secure

Adam Baldwin (@adam_baldwin)

Director of Security, npm

 

https://foundation.nodejs.org/

https://spring.io/understanding/javascript-package-managers

 

Role in the NodeJS project

    Advisory? Active role? Maintain security modules?

    Are there any requirements to being a dev?

    Are there different roles in the NodeJS environment?

    Is there any review of system sensitive packages? (or has that ship sailed…)

 

Discussion of timeline from NodeJS security team

    When were you notified? (or were you notified at all?)

    What steps were taken to fix the issue?

    Lessons learned?

 

Official npm security policy: https://www.npmjs.com/policies/security (good stuff!)

 

Event-stream (initial bug report):   https://github.com/dominictarr/event-stream/issues/116

 

Only affected bitcoin Wallets from ‘Copay’

                    https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2018/11/28/javascript-library-used-for-sneak-attack-on-copay-bitcoin-wallet/

“Cue relief, mixed with frustration, for anyone not targeted. Developer Chris Northwood wrote :

We’ve wiped our brows as we’ve got away with it, we didn’t have malicious code running on our dev machines, our CI servers, or in prod. This time.” (

 

https://medium.com/@jsoverson/exploiting-developer-infrastructure-is-insanely-easy-9849937e81d4

“The damage this could have caused is incredible to think about. The projects that depend on this aren’t trivial either, Microsoft’s original Azure CLI depends on event-stream! Think of the systems that either develop that tool or run that tool. Each one of those potentially had this malicious code installed.”

 

https://thehackernews.com/2018/11/nodejs-event-stream-module.html

“The malicious code detected earlier this week was added to Event-Stream version 3.3.6, published on September 9 via NPM repository, and had since been downloaded by nearly 8 million application programmers.”

 

https://www.analyticsvidhya.com/blog/2018/07/using-power-deep-learning-cyber-security/

 

Hacker News (with comments): https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=18534392

 

Official npm blog post: https://blog.npmjs.org/post/180565383195/details-about-the-event-stream-incident

https://blog.npmjs.org/post/175824896885/incident-report-npm-inc-operations-incident-of

https://resources.whitesourcesoftware.com/blog-whitesource/top-5-open-source-security-vulnerabilities-november-2018

 

2017 package/user stats: https://www.linux.com/news/event/Nodejs/2016/state-union-npm

 

According to npmjs.org: over 800,000 packages (854,000 packages, 7 million+ individual versions)

 

Dependency hell in NodeJS:

https://blog.risingstack.com/controlling-node-js-security-risk-npm-dependencies/

    “Roughly 76% of Node shops use vulnerable packages, some of which are extremely severe; and open source projects regularly grow stale, neglecting to fix security flaws.”

 

History of NodeJS security issues:

 

ESLINT: https://nodesource.com/blog/a-high-level-post-mortem-of-the-eslint-scope-security-incident/

Left-pad: https://www.theregister.co.uk/2016/03/23/npm_left_pad_chaos/

 

How to ensure this type of issue doesn’t happen again? (or is that possible, considering the ecosystem?)

What can devs, blueteams, or companies that live and die by NodeJS do to increase security, or assist in making NPM Security team’s job easier?

 

What the responsibility is of consumers of open source?

 

What can be done to ensure vetting for ‘important’ packages?

Can someone manage turnover? (or is that ship sailed?)

 

Security scanners:

https://geekflare.com/nodejs-security-scanner/

https://techbeacon.com/13-tools-checking-security-risk-open-source-dependencies-0

 

Threat assessment or ‘what could go wrong in the future’?

    Bad code

    “Trust issues”

    Repo corruption

    Hijacking packages

   

Keep up to date on NodeJS security issues:

https://nodejs.org/en/security/

https://groups.google.com/forum/#!forum/nodejs-sec

 

^ this is great for node, but if you want to stay up to date with security advisories in the ecosystem?

npmjs.com/advisories or @npmjs on twitter

https://rubysec.com/ -Ruby security group

 

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2018-042-Election security processes in the state of Ohio

Where in the world is Ms. Amanda Berlin?

    Keynoting hackerconWV

 

Election Security

 

Cuyahoga County:

 

Intro: Jeremy Mio (@cyborg00101

Name?

Why are you here?

 

Discussing Ohio does election operations.

    Walk through the process

Pre-Elections

Elections Night

Post Elections

 

All about the C.I.A.

Votes must be confidential

Votes must not be compromised (integrity)

Voting should be available and without outage

 

Did a tabletop exercise with all counties in Ohio (impressive!)

    Gamified, using role-reversal

    Points based system

    Different technology has different point values

 

Physical security/chain of custody

Retention

 

EI-ISAC - election infra ISAC

https://www.cisecurity.org/services/albert/ - Albert system

https://www.cisecurity.org/best-practices-part-1/ - election security best practices

 

How does the Ohio election process stack up against other states?

 

Media Perception in Elections Hacking and threats

11 year olds ‘hacking election’

    Yes, good for a new article title

    Goes to show how easy it is to actually hack systems

        Train someone on SQLI, pwn the things

 

Elections Security Operations and Preparation

Technology types

    Ballot

    Booths

    Mail-in ballots

 

Securing election infra

    What can be done to make it more secure?

 

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2018-041: part 2 of Kubernetes security insights w/ ian Coldwater

@IanColdwater  https://www.redteamsecure.com/ *new gig*

 

So many different moving parts

Plugins

Code

Hardware

 

She’s working on speaking schedule for 2019

 

How would I use these at home?

    https://kubernetes.io/docs/setup/minikube/

 

Kubernetes - up and running

    https://www.amazon.com/Kubernetes-Running-Dive-Future-Infrastructure/dp/1491935677

 

General wikipedia article (with architecture diagram): https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kubernetes

 

https://twitter.com/alicegoldfuss - Alice Goldfuss

 

Derbycon Talk: http://www.irongeek.com/i.php?page=videos/derbycon8/track-3-10-perfect-storm-taking-the-helm-of-kubernetes-ian-coldwater

 

Tesla mis-configured Kubes env:

 

From the talk: https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2018/02/tesla-cloud-resources-are-hacked-to-run-cryptocurrency-mining-malware/

 

Redlock report mentioned in Ars article:  https://redlock.io/blog/cryptojacking-tesla

 

Setup your own K8s environment: https://kubernetes.io/docs/setup/pick-right-solution/#local-machine-solutions (many options to choose from)

 

Securing K8s implementations: https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/administer-cluster/securing-a-cluster/

 

https://github.com/aquasecurity/kube-hunter -

Threat Model
    What R U protecting?

    Who R U protecting from?

    What R your Adversary’s capabilities?

    What R your capabilities?

 

Defenders think in Lists

Attackers think in Graphs

 

What are some of the visible ports used in K8S?

    44134/tcp - Helmtiller, weave, calico

    10250/tcp - kubelet (kublet exploit)

        No authN, completely open

    10255/tcp - kublet port (read-only)

    4194/tcp - cAdvisor

    2379/tcp - etcd

        Etcd holds all the configs

        Config storage

 

Engineering workflow:

    Ephemeral -  

 

CVE for K8S subpath - https://kubernetes.io/blog/2018/04/04/fixing-subpath-volume-vulnerability/

 

Final points:

    Advice securing K8S is standard security advice

    Use Defense in Depth, and least Privilege

    Be aware of your attack surface

    Keep your threat model in mind

 

David Cybuck (questions from Slack channel)

 

My questions are: 1. Talk telemetry?  What is the best first step for having my containers or kubernetes report information?  (my overlords want metrics dashboards which lead to useful metrics).

 

2. How do you threat model your containers?  Has she ever or how would she begin to run a table-top exercise, a cross between a threat model and a disaster recovery walk through, for the container infrastructure?

 

3. Mitre Att&ck framework, there is a spin off for mobile.  Do we need one for Kube, swarm, or DC/OS?

Here is a new episode of Brakeing Down Security Podcast!

2018-040- Jarrod Frates discusses pentest processes

Jarrod Frates

Inguardians

@jarrodfrates

“Skittering Through Networks”

Ms. Berlin in Germany - How’d it go?

   

TinkerSec’s story:  https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1063423110513418240.html

 

Takeaways

Blue Team:

- Least Privilege Model

- Least Access Model

    “limited remote access to only a small number of IT personnel”

“This user didn't need Citrix, so her Citrix linked to NOTHING”

“They limited access EVEN TO LOCAL ADMINS!”

- Multi-Factor Authentication

- Simple Anomaly Rule Fires

    “Finance doesn’t use Powershell”

- Defense in Depth

    “moving from passwords to pass phrases…”

“Improper disposal of information assets”

 

Red Team:

- Keep Trying

- Never Assume

- Bring In Help

- Luck Favors the Prepared

- Adapt and Overcome

Before the Test

• Talk it over with stakeholders: Reasons, goals, schedules
• Report is the product: Get samples
• Who, what, when, where, why, how
• Talk to testers (and clients, if you can find them)
• • Ask questions
  • Look for past defensive experience and understanding of your needs
  • • Bonus points if they interview you as a client
  • Red flags: Pwning is all they talk about, they set no-crash guarantees, send info in the clear
• Define the scope: Test type(s), inclusions, exclusions, permissions, accounts
• Test in ‘test/dev’, NOT PROD
• Social Engineering: DO THIS. Yes, you’re vulnerable. DO IT ANYWAY.

 

During the Test

• Comms: Keep in contact with the testers
• • Status reports (if the engagement is long enough)
  • Have an established method for escalation
  • Have an open communication style --brbr (WeBrBrs)
• Ask questions, but let the testers do their jobs
• Be available and ready to address critical events
• Keep critical stakeholders informed
• Watch your network: things break, someone else may be getting in, capture packets(?)

 

After the Test

• Getting Results:
• • Report delivered securely
  • Initial summary: How far did they get?
  • Actual report
  • • Written for multiple levels
    • No obvious copy/paste
    • Read, understand, provide feedback, and get revised version
• Next steps:
• • Don’t blame anyone unnecessarily
  • Start planning with stakeholders on fixes
  • Contact vendors, educate staff
• Reacting to report
• Sabotaging your test
• Future testing

 

Ms. Berlin’s Legit business - Mental Health Hackers

 

CFP for Bsides Seattle (Deadline: 26 November 2018) http://www.securitybsides.com/w/page/129078930/BsidesSeattle2019

 

CFP for BsidesNash https://twitter.com/bsidesnash/status/1063084215749787649 Closes Dec 31

 

Teaching a class in Seattle for SANS (SEC504) - need some students! Reach out to me for more information. Looking to do this at the end of February through March

 

 

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Here is a new episode of Brakeing Down Security Podcast!

2018-039-Ian Coldwater, kubernetes, container security

Ian Coldwater-

@IanColdwater  https://www.redteamsecure.com/ *new gig*

 

So many different moving parts

Plugins

Code

Hardware

She’s working on speaking schedule for 2019

How would I use these at home?

    https://kubernetes.io/docs/setup/minikube/

 

Kubernetes - up and running

    https://www.amazon.com/Kubernetes-Running-Dive-Future-Infrastructure/dp/1491935677

 

General wikipedia article (with architecture diagram): https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kubernetes

 

https://twitter.com/alicegoldfuss - Alice Goldfuss

 

Derbycon Talk: http://www.irongeek.com/i.php?page=videos/derbycon8/track-3-10-perfect-storm-taking-the-helm-of-kubernetes-ian-coldwater

 

Tesla mis-configured Kubes env:

 

From the talk: https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2018/02/tesla-cloud-resources-are-hacked-to-run-cryptocurrency-mining-malware/

 

Redlock report mentioned in Ars article:  https://redlock.io/blog/cryptojacking-tesla

 

Setup your own K8s environment: https://kubernetes.io/docs/setup/pick-right-solution/#local-machine-solutions (many options to choose from)

 

Securing K8s implementations: https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/administer-cluster/securing-a-cluster/

 

https://github.com/aquasecurity/kube-hunter -

 

Threat Model
    What R U protecting?

    Who R U protecting from?

    What R your Adversary’s capabilities?

    What R your capabilities?

 

Defenders think in Lists

Attackers think in Graphs

 

What are some of the visible ports used in K8S?

    44134/tcp - Helmtiller, weave, calico

    10250/tcp - kubelet (kublet exploit)

        No authN, completely open

    10255/tcp - kublet port (read-only)

    4194/tcp - cAdvisor

    2379/tcp - etcd

        Etcd holds all the configs

        Config storage

 

Engineering workflow:

    Ephemeral -  

 

CVE for K8S subpath - https://kubernetes.io/blog/2018/04/04/fixing-subpath-volume-vulnerability/

 

Final points:

    Advice securing K8S is standard security advice

    Use Defense in Depth, and least Privilege

    Be aware of your attack surface

    Keep your threat model in mind

 

David Cybuck (questions from Slack channel)

 

My questions are: 1. Talk telemetry?  What is the best first step for having my containers or kubernetes report information?  (my overlords want metrics dashboards which lead to useful metrics).

 

2. How do you threat model your containers?  Has she ever or how would she begin to run a table-top exercise, a cross between a threat model and a disaster recovery walk through, for the container infrastructure?

 

3. Mitre Att&ck framework, there is a spin off for mobile.  Do we need one for Kube, swarm, or DC/OS?

 

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Here is a new episode of Brakeing Down Security Podcast!

2018-038-InfosecSherpa, security culture,

@InfoSecSherpa - Tracy Z. Maleeff (surname is pronounced like “may-leaf.”)

 

I have two talks coming up:

• Empathy as a Service to Create a Culture of Security at the Cofense Submerge conference
• Deep Dive into Social Media as an OSINT Tool at the H-ISAC Fall Summit (Health Information Sharing and Analysis Center)

 

Since National Cyber Security Awareness Month just ended, I wanted to talk about things InfoSec pros can do to help educate others outside our community.

 

*Shameless Plug* My Nuzzel newsletters
https://nuzzel.com/InfoSecSherpa

https://nuzzel.com/InfoSecSherpa/cybersecurity-africa

News stories -

Biglaw Firm Hit With Cybersecurity Incident Earlier This Month (Published: 29 October 2018 | Source: Above the Law) → (Tracy) I wanted to include this story as a discussion of which industries are still in the dark about security issues. To me, it feels like the legal world is either in denial or super slow to adapt. I know from working at law firms for about 10 years, that the industry as a whole is slow to adapt to technology. I once said that law firms are as agile as trying to turn a cruise ship when it came to technology.

 

https://www.cio.com/article/3212829/cyber-attacks-espionage/hackers-are-aggressively-targeting-law-firms-data.html

Porn-Watching Employee Infected Government Networks With Russian Malware, IG Says (Published: 25 October 2018 | Source: Next Gov)

 

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